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multiplicative demand function to model the uncertain demand, and develop a robust 
counterpart to replace the uncertain demand constraint. The sellers' robust best response 
problem yields a generalized Nash equilibrium problem, which can be formulated as an 
equivalent, continuous-time quasi-variational inequality. We demonstrate that, for appropriate 
regularity conditions, a generalized robust Nash equilibrium exists. We show that the quasi-
variational inequality may be replaced by an equivalent variational inequality, and use a fixed-
point algorithm to solve the variational inequality. We also demonstrate how explicit time lags 
associated with price updating in real-world decision environments, as well as specific pricing 
decision rules, may be introduced to create a dual time scale formulation and the associated 
solutions computed. We illustrate, via numerical examples, how robust pricing based on our DPFI 
formulation offers generally superior and never inferior worst case performance compared to 
nominal pricing. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
We explore the dynamic pricing of an abstract commodity in an oligopolistic market. 
Each seller's inventory is specified at an initial time but never subsequently replenished. 
Every seller competes with each other by setting its prices. Perakis and Sood (2006) refer 
to such problems as dynamic pricing with fixed inventory (DPFI) and study them with 
demand uncertainty over a finite discrete time horizon. They employ the ideas from 
robust optimization and quasi-variational inequality to address this problem.  
There is a specific and compelling motivation for the study of DPFI problems: they form 
a theoretical foundation for a broad class of revenue management problems. More 
specifically, they are an abstraction of service systems whose output for a given planning 
horizon cannot be held in inventory. As such, they capture the essence of actual airline, 
ferry, rail, transit, and other transportation pricing and service timing decisions.  
Unlike Perakis and Sood (2006), we study a generic DPFI using a continuous-time 
perspective, which includes computation in continuous time, and we model demand 
uncertainty in a quite different way. As we shall show, our approach to formulating a 
generic DPFI problem allows us to easily establish sufficiency of the quasivariational 
inequality that is a necessary condition for each firm’s best response problem, in 
contrast to the much less direct demonstration of sufficiency in Perakis and Sood (2006).  
Moreover, the use of continuous time allows us to easily and naturally extend the 
analysis of fixed inventory problems to explicitly consider dual time scales; thereby, we 
are able to introduce explicit pricing rules that recognize the intrinsic time lag that 
characterizes price adjustments in actual decision environments. Such features are not 
addressed by Perakis and Sood (2006). 
Extension of some parts of the Perakis and Sood (2006) model to infinite dimensional 
vector spaces is trivial; extension of other parts of their discrete time model to 
continuous time are not straight forward and require carefully crafted arguments. This 
paper provides the detailed analysis, including re-casting the problem as a robust infinite 
dimensional quasi-variational inequality, and showing a robust generalized Nash 
equilibrium exists. We present a continuous-time fixed point algorithm whose 
subproblems are linear quadratic optimal control problems to obtain the robust 
generalized Nash equilibrium. Several fixed inventory numerical examples are presented. 
Since dynamic optimization usually occurs in continuous time, it makes our continuous-
time model more realistic. And our continuous-time perspective makes use of the 
notion of an infinite dimensional quasi-variational inequality. To the best of our 
knowledge, the theory of continuous-time quasi-variational inequality that we study in 
this paper has not previously been applied to revenue management and production 
planning. 
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Many service provision problems may be conceptualized as DPFI-problems. The sale of 
seats on a plane making a single outbound flight, as might arise for chartered aircraft, is 
an example. As such DPFI-problems represent a kind of proto-service environment that 
allows the undistracted exploration of issues intrinsic to dynamic pricing. In the spirit of 
Perakis and Sood (2006), we make the following assumptions: 
1. Perfect information. We assume that perfect information obtains at the outset 
about the structure of demand, the impact of price changes on demand, and the 
initial inventory. 
2. Consumer choice and demand. We assume that demand for the output of each 
seller is a function only of current prices, and prices are the only factor that 
distinguishes products from one another. 
3. Product. We assume there is a single product and that inventory must be zero at 
the terminal time. This assumption is consistent with the view that inventory is 
saleable for all ),[ 0 fttt and is worthless at ft . 
4. Objectives. We further assume that sellers maximize the present value of their 
respective revenues by setting prices and do not employ any other type of 
strategies. Accordingly a generalized Nash equilibrium will describe the market 
of interest. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Dynamic pricing has been extensively researched in the literature of revenue 
management. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) consider a monopolistic dynamic pricing 
problem with fixed inventory over a finite continuous-time horizon. For a family of 
exponential demand functions, the optimal pricing policy can be derived in closed form. 
For general demand function, they find an upper bound on the expected revenue and 
obtain the form of near-optimal policies. Feng and Xiao (2000) also address a 
continuous-time monopolistic dynamic pricing problem. They assume reversible price 
changes are allowed and demand follows a Poisson process. The problem is formulated 
as an intensity control model, and the optimal prices are obtained in closed form. Levin 
et al. (2010) study a dynamic pricing problem for a monopolistic firm in the presence of 
strategic consumers who know that pricing is dynamic and may adjust their purchases 
accordingly. They formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic game, and 
demonstrate the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium pricing policy. For 
surveys on monopolistic dynamic pricing problem, see Weatherford and Bodily (1992), 
McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), Bitran and Caldentey 
(2003), and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). 
Recently, there is a growing interest to consider competition in dynamic pricing problem. 
Gallego et al. (2006) study a sequential game and a repeated simultaneous game in a 
duopoly market. Both firms with fixed inventory sell products in both a forward market 
and a spot market. Granot et al. (2010) address a multi-period, no-replenishment, 
dynamic pricing problem under duopoly competition. They assume that every consumer 
visits only one retailer in any period. If the price is lower than the consumer's valuation, 
he will purchase the product. Otherwise he will visit the other retailer in the next period. 
 4 
Kachani et al. (2004) and Kwon et al. (2009) consider dynamic pricing with fixed 
inventory in an oligopolistic setting integrating demand learning. Kachani et al. (2004) 
assume demand is a linear function and formulate the problem as a Mathematical 
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Kwon et al. (2009) model demand 
dynamics as a differential equation based on evolutionary game theory and learn the 
demand parameters based on Kalman filtering. Lin and Sibdari (2009) introduce a game-
theoretic model to describe dynamic price competition between firms. They prove the 
existence of Nash equilibrium. Levin et al. (2009) address a dynamic pricing problem for 
oligopolistic firms facing strategic consumers. They prove that a unique subgame-perfect 
equilibrium exists and discuss the impact of strategic consumer behavior on revenue. 
Gallego and Hu (2009) present a choice-based dynamic pricing model for oligopolistic 
firms selling persihable inventories over a continuous finite horizon. They show the 
existence and uniqueness of the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Demand uncertainty is another important aspect in our paper. Zabel (1970) considers 
two approaches to model demand uncertainty: a multiplicative demand model 
( ))(()()( tputtd  and an additive demand model ( )())(()( ttputd  , where 
)(td is the demand at time t , )(tp is the price at time t , ()u is a linear decreasing 
function of price, and )(t is the uncertainty factor at time t . Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004) 
also introduce two models for demand function: an additive demand function 
( tttttt pDpD   )(),( ) and a nonadditive demand function 
( ttttttt pDpD   )(),( ), where ),( ttt   and t , t are two random variables 
with 1}{ tE  and 0}{ tE  . Perakis and Sood (2006) model uncertain demand as a 
function of price and an uncertainty factor which is a vector of demand parameters that 
can take any value from a given closed and convex uncertainty set. In this paper, we use 
the multiplicative demand function to model demand uncertainty. 
There are several ways to deal with demand uncertainty in optimization problems. 
Robust optimization is one of them, which we will use in this paper. The earliest 
research on robust optimization dates back to Soyster (1973), who considers a linear 
optimization problem and assumes all uncertain parameters take the worst-case values 
from a convex set. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998) consider a robust convex optimization 
problem with an ellipsoidal uncertainty set and show that the robust convex progam of 
some convex optimization problems, such as linear programming, quadratically 
constrained programming, semidefinite programming, can be exactly or approximately 
solved by polynomial time interior point algorithm. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1999) 
address a linear programming with uncertain data, and replace the uncertain linear 
programming by a robust counterpart. In particular, for an linear programming with 
ellipsoidal uncertainty set, the corresponding robust counterpart can be solved in 
polynomial time. Perakis and Sood (2006) consider a competitive dynamic pricing 
problem based on robust optimization approach over a finite discrete time horizon. 
Bertsimas and Thiele (2006) employ the ideas of robust optimization to address the 
optimal inventory control problem in a supply chain. Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) apply 
robust optimization to a distribution-free model of games with incomplete information, 
and provide a robust-optimization equilibrium. Leung et al. (2007) propose a robust 
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optimization model to solve a multi-site production planning problem with uncertain 
data. 
1.3 Contributions and Organization of the paper 
The contributions of this paper are the following: 
1. We extend the discrete-time DPFI model of Perakis and Sood (2006) to 
continuous-time DPFI model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to use robust optimization and quasi-variational inequality to address the 
oligopolistic dynamic pricing problem with demand uncertainty over a finite 
continuous-time horizon. 
2. We model uncertain demand as a multiplicative demand function, and restate 
the uncertain demand constraint by a robust counterpart, which leads the 
robust optimization problem become a deterministic optimization problem. 
3. The sellers' best response problem yields a generalized Nash equilibrium 
problem (GNEP) which can be represented as a quasi-variational inequality 
(QVI). We prove the equivalence between GNEP and QVI, and the existence of a 
generalized robust Nash equilibrium. 
4. Since efficient convergent algorithm for solving QVI is not available, we 
construct a variational inequality (VI) which can be efficiently solved by a fixed 
point algorithm, and show that any solution of the VI is a solution of the QVI. 
5. Numerical examples show that a seller using our robust pricing policy can always 
obtain a profit with standard deviation 0, and can improve much better the 
worst-case performance compared to nominal pricing policy. For some 
distributions of the uncertainty factor, robust pricing policy can generate higher 
average profit than nominal pricing policy. We also find that upon a certain 
level of robust magnitude, reducing standard deviation would sacrifice a slight 
of average profit. 
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 states the notation and the regularity 
conditions that will be used throughout this paper. Section 3 models the best response 
problem for each seller. In section 4, we articulate a robust counterpart of the best 
response problem. Section 5 formulates the generalized robust Nash equilibrium as a 
quasi-variational inequality. In section 6, we build a VI and show that any solution of the 
VI is a solution of the QVI. A fixed point algorithm is introduced to solve the VI. Section 7 
provides some numerical examples. Section 8 summarizes our conclusions. 
2 Notation and Regularity Conditions 
We will use )(ts to denote the price charged by seller Ss at time ],[ 0 fttt , where 
S denotes the set of all sellers and ],[ 0
2
fs ttL , 
1
0 Rt , 
1
Rt f , and 0tt f  , 
where ],[ 0
2
fttL is the space of square-integrable functions, a Hilbert space. For any 
subscript Ss and any given instant of time ],[ 01 fttt  , we stress that 
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1
1)( Rts is a scalar. Let )\:( sSggs   be a column vector of non-own prices. 
We also use the notation ||0
2 ]),[():( Sfs ttLSs   to represent the column 
vector of prices that are the decision variables of the model to be constructed. We use 
the notation ],[]),[(:));(( 0
11||
0
2
f
S
fss ttHRttLth   to represent the observed 
demand for the output of each seller Ss corresponding to a specific realization of the 
vector of parameters ||0
2 ]),[( mfss ttLU  , where sU is uncertainty set. 
],[ 0
1
fttH is the Sobolev space of functions that belong to ],[ 0
2
fttL and have 
derivatives also belonging to ],[ 0
2
fttL ; furthermore ],[ 0
1
fttH is a Hilbert space. We 
let )(tDs represent the realized demand served by seller Ss , and define column 
vectors 
||
0
2 ]),[():( Sfs ttLSsDD   
||
0
1 ]),[():( Sfs ttHSshh   
Realized demands will also be decision variables. Since realized demand must be less 
than or equal to observed demand, for each seller Ss , we impose the constraint 
],[,));(()( 0 fsss tttSsthtD     (1) 
or equivalently
  
],[))(()( 0 ftttthtD    (2)   
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, we invoke the following regularity 
conditions:  
A1. Prices are bounded from above and below according to 
1
min  Rs   
1
max  Rs   
for all Ss , where 0);,(sup max
,


sssh
ss


 
A2. Fulfilled demand is bounded from below by a positive constant; that is 
1
min  RDDs  
      for all Ss . 
A3. Every observed demand function );( sh  is concave in for all feasible prices 
and all uncertainty vectors s . 
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A4. For any fixed s  and uncertainty factors s , every demand function is 
strictly monotonically decreasing in own price; that is 
0)()];,();,()[exp( 1121
0
  dthht ss
t
t ssssssss
f 
 
       for all Ss and all feasible prices 21 ss   . 
A5. Every demand function is linear in uncertainty factor s , that is  
0
2
2



s
sh

  
       for all Ss . 
A6. Each norm );,( sssshs   is monotone increasing in own price s for 
all Ss , all feasible prices   and all uncertainty factors s . 
Assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4 were made by Perakis and Sood (2006). Assumptions A5 
and A6 are unique to this exposition and may be motivated by considering the following 
commonly illustrative linear demand function with multiplicative uncertainty factor: 
s
sr
rsrsssssssh  )();,( 

     (3) 
where 1,, Rsrss   for all Srs , . By inspection (3) is a linear function of  and 
a decreasing function of own price, so assumptions A3 and A4 are satisfied. It is also 
clear that (3) is a linear function of s , is a scalar in this specific case, and assumption A5 
is satisfied. Moreover, for (3) we have 


 
sr
rsrssssssshs
 );,(
 
which is a scalar and leads to 


 
sr
rsrssssssshs
 );,(   (4) 
By inspection (4) is an increasing function of own price and Assumption A6 is satisfied. 
3 Best Response Problem 
For any given but arbitrary s , seller Ss seeks to solve the following infinite 
dimensional mathematical program 
 
ft
t sssss
dttDttDJ
0
)()()exp(max),(max    (5) 
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subject to 
sssssss UhD    );,(   (6) 

ft
t ss
dttDK
0
)(   (7) 
1
min  Rs    (8) 
1
max  Rs    (9) 
1
min  RDDs   (10) 
where sK is the initial endowment of inventory possessed by each seller Ss . Note 
that  
It is helpful to re-state problem (5) through (10) as 
),(),(..
)()()exp(max),(max
0
sssss
t
t sssss
Dts
dttDttDJ
f



    (11) 
where 
0);,(,0
,0)(,0,0:),(),(
min
maxmin
0






 
ssssss
s
t
t ssssssss
hDDD
KdttDD
f


 
is the strategy space for seller Ss . We also define 
}),(),(:),{()( SsDD sssss      (12) 
The strategy space ),( sss  is convex for all Ss , a result formalized in the 
following lemma: 
Lemma 1 Seller's convex strategy space. For each seller Ss , take ),( sssh   to be 
concave in s for all s  (Assumption A3). Then the robust strategy space of each 
seller, ),( sss  , is convex in ),( ss D  for all Ss . Furthermore, )( is 
convex in ),( D . 
Proof: Note that all the constraint functions for seller Ss are convex functions. In 
particular, let us consider the constraint 
0)()(
0
  s
t
t sss
KdttDDg
f
 
For arbitrary points 1sD  and 
2
sD with
1]1,0[  R , we have 
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)()1()(
)()1()(
)1()()1()(
)]()1()([)]()1()([
21
21
21
2121
00
00
0
ssss
s
t
t ss
t
t s
s
t
t ss
t
t s
s
t
t sssss
DgDg
KdttDKdttD
KdttDKdttD
KdttDtDtDtDg
ff
ff
f
























 
Thus, )( ss Dg  is linear and hence convex. All constraint functions are convex for 
seller Ss , therefore, ),( sss   is convex as a set. Moreover, the convexity of 
the ),( sss  for all Ss  assures the convexity of )( . ■ 
Furthermore, we know that, for the function spaces stipulated, the G-derivative of the 
criterion functional is 
  dttDt
dtDt
dt
D
t
dt
DDD
t
dt
DD
t
DJ
f
f
f
f
f
t
t
D
ss
Dss
t
t
t
t
DssD
t
t
ssDssDss
t
t
ssDss
Dsss






















0
0
0
0
0
)exp(,)exp(
)()exp(
1
)exp(lim
)(
)exp(lim
))((
)exp(lim
),;,(
0
2
0
0






















    (13) 
Of course 
dtDJDJ
ft
t ssssDsss   0
]),([),;,(     (14) 
where  







D



 
Upon comparing (13) and (14) we see that 

















s
s
ss
ss
ssss
t
Dt
DJ
J
DJ



)exp(
)exp(
),(   (15) 
Therefore, the first order condition, when ),(),( ** sssss D    is a solution, takes 
the form 
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0),;,( ** Dsss DJ    
for all feasible directions 
*
ss   , 
*
ssD DD   
The above is easily re-stated in the more familiar form 
0),,(
*
*
** 











ss
ss
ssss
DD
DJ


 
or equivalently as 
),(),(
0)(
),(
)(
),(
0
*
**
*
**
sssss
t
t ss
s
sss
ss
s
sss
D
dtDD
D
DJDJf





















  
In light of our knowledge of the gradient of the criterion sJ , this last quasi-variational 
inequality may be stated as 
),(),(
0])()()[exp(
0
****
sssss
t
t ssssss
D
dtDDDt
f



   (16) 
Statement (16) will not only be a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition if 
),( sss DJ  is pseudo-concave on ),( sss  . The pseudo-concavity of each seller's 
criterion will allow us to establish an equivalent variational inequality formulation of the 
generalized Nash equilibrium among sellers described by (11). To that end we state and 
prove the following result: 
Lemma 2 Seller's criterion is pseudo-concave. For each Ss , the criterion ),( sss DJ   
is pseudo-concave on ),( sss  . 
Proof: For the criterion ),( sss DJ  to be pseudo-concave on ),( sss  , we must 
show that 
),(),(0),,( 1122
21
21
22
ssssss
ss
ss
ssss DJDJ
DD
DJ 

 










   (17) 
for ),( 11 ss D , ),(),(
22
sssss D   . Property (17) is assured if 
sssss DDR  ),( is pseudo-concave at each instant of time ],[ 0 fttt . By Theorem 9 
of Ferland (1972), we know that ),()1( ssss DRZ  is pseudo-convex (and 
hence ),( sss DR  is pseudo-concave), if the following matrix 
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


















































01
10
0
0
2
22
2
2
2
s
s
ss
s
s
ss
s
s
s
ss
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s D
D
D
Z
D
Z
D
Z
D
ZZZ
D
ZZ
M





 
has a determinant that is strictly negative. We note that 
02det  sss DM   
since each seller Ss is constrained to employ a strictly positive solution bounded away 
from the origin. ■ 
We are now prepared to present and prove the following result: 
Theorem 1 Quasi-variational inequality equivalent to best response. The quasi-
variational inequality (16) is equivalent to the infinite dimensional mathematical 
program (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10). 
Proof: We have already demonstrated that a solution of the best response problem will 
obey (16) in the discussion preceding Lemma 2. It remains to show that any solution of 
(16) is a solution of (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10). Note that because of the pseudo-
concavity of the best response criterion, as expressed by (17), the variational inequality 
(16) implies 




f
f
t
t ss
sss
t
t sssss
dttDtt
DJDJdttDtt
0
0
)()()exp(
),(),()()()exp( ****


  (18) 
for all ),(),( sssss D   . Thus, a solution ),(),(
**
sssss D    of the 
variational inequality associated with seller Ss is a solution of the infinite 
dimensional mathematical program describing that seller's best response. ■ 
Existence of a solution of the best response problem can be assured by the following 
result: 
Theorem 2 Existence of a best response. The best response problem (11) faced by seller 
Ss with the assumptions introduced in Section 2 has a solution. 
Proof: We note that (16) may be stated as 
],[],[),(,0),( 0
2
0
2***
ffsssvsvsss ttLttLVvvvvvvF      (19) 
when 
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








s
s
t
Dt
F


)exp(
)exp(
     






s
s
s
D
v

     ssv    
By Theorem 2 of Browder (1968), we know that (19) has a solution because 
),( sss v   is a convex and compact subset of V whileF is a continuous mapping of 
),( sss v  into VV 
* . ■ 
We next make note of the following: 
Lemma 3 Demand constraint (1) binds for some ss U . For every competitor Ss , 
given her competitors' strategies s , a solution ),(
**
ss D  of a best response 
problem having constraints expressed as ),(),( rrrss D   and whose criterion 
is monotonically increasing in own price satisfies );,( *** sssss hD    
for some 
ss U
* . 
Proof: This result is proven in Perakis and Sood (2006) for a discrete time formulation of 
the same problem; its adaptation to the continuous-time models considered herein is 
trivial and hence omitted for the sake of brevity. ■ 
We are now in a position to observe that the seller's best response policy is a unique 
strategy: 
Lemma 4 Seller's best policy is unique. For each Ss  and all Sr such that 
sr  and ),(),( rrrrr D   , any solution of variational inequality (16) is a unique 
solution of the best response problem. 
Proof: We recall the assumed monotonicity of demand for own arguments: for any 
ss U  
),(,0))](;,();,()[exp( 2121*2*1
0
ssssssssssss
t
t
dthht
f      (20) 
For a given s and
*
s , we chose s and 
*
s as follows: 
);,(minarg * ssss
U
s h
ss





 
);,(minarg *** ssss
U
s h
ss





 
Thus, we have for any s and ss U
*  
0))](;,();,()[exp( ****
0
  dthht ssssssssss
t
t
f 
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0))](;,();,()[exp( ******
0
  dthht ssssssssss
t
t
f 
 
There are two cases: 
1. When ss  
* , 
);,();,();,( ****** ssssssssssss hhh     
then we have 
0))](;,();,()[exp( *****
0
  dthht ssssssssss
t
t
f 
 
2. When *ss   , 
);,();,();,( ****** ssssssssssss hhh     
then we have 
0))](;,();,()[exp( *****
0
  dthht ssssssssss
t
t
f 
 
In both cases, 
0))](;,();,()[exp( *****
0
  dthht ssssssssss
t
t
f    (21) 
From Lemma 3, we know );,( *** sssss hD   , thus (21) can be re-stated as 
0))](;,()[exp( ***
0
  dthDt sssssss
t
t
f    (22) 
We next recall the variational inequality associated with the best response problem:  
),(),(,0)]()()[exp( ****
0
sssssssssss
t
t
DdtDDDt
f     
(23)Adding (22) and (23) yields 
),(),(
0)]())(;,()[exp( ****
0
sssss
sssssssss
t
t
D
dtDDht
f





   (24) 
which may be re-stated as 
),(),(0);,()exp( *
0
ssssssss
t
t s
DdtQt
f      (25) 
where 
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****** )];,([);,();,( sssssssssssssssss DhDhQ      (26) 
Define 
}0);,(:{sup *0   sssssss hD
s

  
Upon taking 0ss   and noting that Lemma 3 requires );,(
*0
sssss hD   , (26) 
becomes 
****0*0 );,( ssssssssssss DDDDQ     (27) 
In light of (27), inequality (25) yields 
0);,()exp()exp()exp( *0**
000
  dtQtdtDtdtDt sss
t
t ss
t
t ss
t
t s
fff 
  
(28) 
which establishes that a solution of variational inequality (16) is a unique global solution 
of the best response problem of competitor Ss . ■ 
4 Robust Best Response Problem 
We next articulate a robust counterpart of the best response problem for seller Ss . 
This is accomplished by adding to the demand constraints 
sssssss USshD    ,0);,(  
an additional term that represents a safety margin or so-called protection level. Based 
on the nominal values of uncertain parameters 
SsttL mfs  ]),[( 0
20
 
we may introduce the uncertainty sets 
SsRtttU ss   }1)(:)()({
10    (29) 
where 

ft
t
T dtttt
0
)()]([)(
2
   (30) 
and 
m
fs ttLt ]),[()( 0
2
 
m
fttLt ]),[()( 0
2
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The following result provides the robust constraint needed to articulate the robust best 
response problem for each seller Ss : 
Lemma 5 Robust counterpart of constraint (6). For each seller Ss , the set of 
constraints 
}0);,({ sssssss UhD     
has the following robust counterpart: 
sssssssssss UhhD s
    0);,();,(
00
 
where the norm is taken in mfttL ]),[( 0
2 . 
Proof: In proving this lemma, we are influenced by the approach of Zhang (2007) for a 
similar but not identical result. Let us first introduce the following definition: 
}0);,();,,( ssssssssssss UhDDg     
We seek 
0);,,(max 

sssss
U
Dg
ss

  
Using a first-order Taylor expansion around the nominal value 0s , we obtain 
dtDg
Dg
dtDg
DgDg
f
s
f
s
ss
ss
t
t
T
sssss
sssss
t
t ss
T
sssss
U
ssssssssss
U













0
0
)];,,([max
);,,(
)()];,,([max
);,,();,,(max
0
1
0
00
0









  
(31) 
where (31) is a maximization problem having  as its vector of decision variables. Note 
that the above expansion is not a local approximation, because the function being 
expanded is linear in s (Assumption A5). From the 
2L -version of the well-known 
Schwarz's inequality†, we have 
                                                          
†
 See, for example, Rudin (1987). 
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2
1
2
1
00
0
00
0
)];,,([)];,,([
)];,,([


















dtdtDgDg
dtDg
ff
ss
f
s
t
t
Tt
t sssss
T
sssss
t
t
T
sssss




 
Therefore, 
);,,(
)];,,([)];,,([
)];,,([max
)];,,([max
0
2
1
00
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
sssss
t
t sssss
T
sssss
t
t
T
sssss
t
t
T
sssss
Dg
dtDgDg
dtDg
dtDg
s
f
ss
f
s
f
s





























  (32) 
in light of (30). Consequently, we have 
0);,,();,,();,,(max 00  

sssssssssssssss
U
DgDgDg
s
ss
 
  
Therefore, the robust counterpart of constraint (6) is 
0);,();,( 00   sssssssss hhD s    
since 
);,();,();,,( 000 sssssssssssss hhDg sss
   
 
■ 
The robust best response problem may be stated as 
 
ft
t sssss
dttDttDJ
0
)()()exp(max),(max    (33) 
subject to 
0);,();,( 00   sssssssss hhD s     (34) 

ft
t ss
dttDK
0
)(   (35) 
1
min  Rs    (36) 
1
max  Rs    (37) 
1
min  RDDs   (38) 
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We would like the robust best response problem to be a generalized convex program, so 
that its necessary conditions are also sufficient and global solutions may be computed. 
In preparation for our analysis of the robust best response problem, we state and prove 
the following result: 
Lemma 6 Monotonicity of the robust constraint. Let assumption A6 hold so that the 
norm  
);,( 0sssshs
    (39) 
is monotone increasing in own price s . Then, for all Ss , each robust constraint 
function 
);,();,();,,( 0000 ssssssssssssss hhDDg s
   
 
forming the lefthand-side of (34) is monotone increasing in s . 
Proof: Clearly for arbitrary feasible 1s and
2
s , monotonicity of (39) requires 
0)( 2121 



  ssss hh ss    (40) 
where we have used the abbreviations 
2,1);,( 0   khh s
k
s
k
ss
k
s ss
  
The monotone decreasing nature of );,( ssssh    with respect to s is expressed 
as 
  0)( 2121  ssss hh   
or 
  0)( 2121  ssss hh    (41) 
Multiplying (40) by and adding the result to (41) gives 
0)( 212121 



  ssssss hhhh ss  
 
which may be arranged to reveal 
0)( 212211 



 



 



  ssssssss hhDhhD ss     (42) 
where we have added and subtracted sD from the leading term of (42). The desired 
result is proven. ■ 
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We next observe that 
Lemma 7 Quasiconvexity of a monotone function of a single variable. A monotone 
increasing function of a single variable is quasiconvex. 
Proof: We consider 11: RRf  , ],[, 0
221
fttLxx   
Assume 21 xx  , in light of the assumed monotonicity, we have 
)()( 21 xfxf   
)())1(( 221 xfxxf    
when ]1,0[ . It is immediate that 
)](),(max[))1(( 2121 xfxfxxf    
which is the defining property of a quasiconvex function. ■ 
The results developed above lead to 
Lemma 8 Quasiconvexity of robust constraints. Under the assumptions of Lemma 6, 
each robust constraint function 
);,();,();,,( 0000 ssssssssssssss hhDDg s
     
forming the lefthand-side of (34) is quasiconvex in s for all Ss . 
Proof: The result follows immediately from Lemma 6 and 7. ■ 
Lemma 6 establishes that quasiconvexity of the robust demand constraints will occur so 
long as minD is not too small relative to other parameters. However, as has already been 
remarked, the most important implication of Lemma 8 is that the robust best response 
problem given by (33) through (38) is a generalized convex program involving the 
maximization of a pseudo-concave objective subject to quasiconvex inequality 
constraints. In particular Lemma 8 allows us to establish the following result: 
Lemma 9 Feasible region of the robust best response problem is convex. For every 
seller Ss , the set 
0);,,(,0
,0)(,0,0:),(),(
00
min
maxmin
0
0






 
ssssss
s
t
t ssssssss
DgDD
KdttDD
f


 
is convex. 
Proof: It is well known (see Avriel, 1976, Theorem 6.1) that the level sets of a 
quasiconvex function are convex; hence 
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
0);,();,(
);,,(:),();(
00
0000




sssssssss
ssssssssss
hhD
DgDG
s



 
is a convex set for every Ss by virtue of Lemma 8. Furthermore 

0
,0)(,0,0:),(
min
maxmin
0

 
s
s
t
t ssssss
DD
KdttDDE
f
 
is convex by virtue of Lemma 8. Since 
sssssss EG   ),(),(
000 
 
for Ss , the desired result follows immediately. ■ 
We are led by virtue of the above development to the following result: 
Theorem 3 Quasi-variational inequality equivalent to robust best response. The 
following infinite dimensional quasi-variational inequality is equivalent to the infinite 
dimensional mathematical program (33), (34), (35), (36), (37) and (38) that describes the 
robust best response of each seller Ss : 
find ),(),( 0** sssss D   such that 
),(),(0)]()([)exp( 0****
0
sssssssssss
t
t
DdtDDDt
f  
  
(43) 
where 
0);,,(,0
,0)(,0,0:),(),(
00
min
maxmin
0
0






 
ssssss
s
t
t ssssssss
DgDD
KdttDD
f


 
Proof: In light of Lemma 9, the arguments of Lemma 2 apply. ■ 
Existence of a solution of the robust best response problem can be assured by the 
following result: 
Theorem 4 Existence of a robust best response. The robust best response problem (33), 
(34), (35), (36), (37) and (38) faced by seller Ss with the assumptions introduced in 
Section 2 has a solution. 
Proof: The proof employs arguments identical to those used in the proof of Theorem 2. 
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5 Quasi-Variational Inequality Formulation of the 
Generalized Robust Nash Equilibrium 
We are now interested in formulating the non-cooperative game among sellers 
described by the robust best response problem (33) through (38). We employ, as a 
solution concept for that game, the notion of a generalized robust Nash equilibrium. The 
relevant result is the following: 
Theorem 5 Generalized Robust Nash equilibrium among sellers expressible as a quasi-
variational inequality. The generalized robust Nash equilibrium among sellers 
Ss that is described by best response problem (33), (34), (35), (36), (37) and (38), is 
equivalent to the following market quasi-variational inequality: 
find ),(),( 0***  D such that 



Ss
ssssss
t
t
DdtDDDt
f
),(),(0)]()([)exp( 0*****
0

  
(44) 
where 



Ss
sss ),(),(
0*0* 
 
when the regularity conditions known as A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6 hold. 
Proof: First we note that summation of (43) over Ss yields (44); thus, the following 
concatenation of solutions of robust best response problems 
),,;,,(),( * ||
**
1
*
||
**
1
**
SsSs DDDD     
is a solution of (44). It remains to show that any solution of (44) also solves the 
individual robust best response problems for all Ss . To that end, we note that (44) 
may be re-stated as 



Ss
ssss
t
t
dtDDt
f
0)()exp(max **
0
   (45) 
subject to 
SsD sssss   ),(),(
0*    (46) 
The mathematical program formed by (45) and (46) may be decomposed into seller-
specific programs of the form 
),(),(..0)()exp(max 0***
0
sssssssss
t
t
DtsdtDDt
f  
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(47) 
for each Ss . By inspection of (47), we have that the 2-tuple ),( ** ss D  must obey 
),(),(
)()exp()()exp(
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t
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dtDDtdtDDt
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


 
 (48) 
for each Ss . From (48) we have for each Ss that 
),(),(0)]()([)exp( 0*****
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(49) 
Expression (49) is recognized as the variational inequality that is equivalent to the robust 
best response problem of seller Ss . Thus, any solution of the market robust quasi-
variational inequality provides solutions for the robust best response problems of all 
sellers. The proof is complete. ■ 
We also want to establish that the market equilibrium described by (44) exists. That 
result is provided by the following theorem: 
Theorem 6 Existence of a generalized robust Nash equilibrium. The market quasi-
variational inequality (44), for the assumptions introduced in Section 2 has a solution. As 
a result, a generalized robust Nash equilibrium exists. 
Proof: We note that (44) may be stated as 
||2
0
20**** ]),[(),(,0),( SfttLVvvvvvF     (50) 
when 
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By Theorem 2 of Browder (1968), we know that (50) has a solution because ),( 0*   
is a convex and compact subset of V while F is a continuous mapping of 
),( 0*  into VV * . In light of Theorem 5, a generalized robust Nash equilibrium 
exists. ■ 
6 Solving the Market Quasi-Variational Inequality 
In this section, we wish to devise an algorithm for solving the generalized robust Nash 
equilibrium for competitive dynamic pricing with fixed inventories. Since the quasi-
variational inequality (44) is our representation of the generalized robust Nash 
equilibrium, we need a numerical scheme for solving a continuous-time quasi-variational 
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inequality. Efficient convergent methods for solving general quasi-variational 
inequalities are not available. Therefore, we restrict ourselves, for reasons that will be 
made clear shortly, to the following class of demand constraint functions for every Ss : 
);();();,,( 02010 ssssssssssss ggDDg      (51) 
where 
);( 01 sssg  =an instantaneously monotone decreasing function of own price s   
);( 02 sssg  =an instantaneously monotone increasing function of non-own prices 
s  
In that );( 01 sssg   is related to own-demand and );(
02
sssg  to non-own demand, 
the monotone properties given to them above are behaviorally realistic. 
6.1 Variational Inequality Solutions 
We will make use a trivial extension of a result first given by Harker (1991). In abstract 
form, the result pertains to the following quasi-variational inequality:  
find )(),( *** xyx   such that 
)(),(0),,(),,( ****2
***
1 xyxyyyxFxxyxF    (52) 
where 
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The result of interest is the following: 
Theorem 7 Variational inequality solutions of quasi-variational inequalities. If there is a 
set  such that 
(i)  xx)(  
(ii)  xxx )(  
then any solution of the variational inequality: find ),( ** yx such that 
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 ),(0),,(),,( ***2
***
1 yxyyyxFxxyxF
 
is a solution of the quasi-variational inequality (52). 
Proof: This is a trivial extension of Theorem 3 of Harker (1991), and the proof given 
there is easily adapted to prove the above result. ■ 
Now, following Harker (1991), we let have the form 
}0),(,:),{(  yxgyyx   (53) 
with 
),(),(),( 21 yxgyxgyxg    (54) 
If we define 
}0),(),(,:),{()( *21*  yxgyxgyyxx   (55) 
then conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 7 are satisfied. Furthermore the abstract sets 
 and )(x have a structure that mimics the constraints of the fixed inventory dynamic 
pricing problem of interest here. Thus, Theorem 7 assures that any solution of the 
following variational inequality will be a solution of the quasi-variational inequality (44): 
find ),( ** D such that 
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The preceding discussion constitutes a constructive result of the following: 
Theorem 8 VI that solves the QVI. Any solution of the variational inequality (56) will 
solve the quasi-variational inequality (44). 
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6.2 Equivalent Fixed Point Problem 
It is possible to solve (56) using a simple but effective fixed point algorithm. To 
understand the fixed point algorithm is helpful to consider the following abstract 
variational inequality: find Uu * such that 
UuuutuF  0),,( **   (57) 
where 
m
f
m
f ttHRttLF ]),[(]),[(: 0
11
0
2    
m
fttLU ]),[( 0
2
 
We have the following result: 
Theorem 9 Fixed point formulation of infinite dimensional variational inequality. If 
),( tuF is differentiable and convex with respect tou while U is convex, the variational 
inequality (56) is equivalent to the following fixed point problem: 
)],([ ** tuFuPu U    (58) 
where ][UP is the minimum norm projection onto U and 
1
R is an arbitrary 
positive constant. 
Proof: The fixed point problem under consideration requires that 

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2
1
minarg
2
***    (59) 
where 1R is any positive real scalar. That is, to solve the fixed point problem, we 
seek the solution of 
    UutsdtutuFuutuFuZ
T
t
tu
f
  ..),(),(2
1
min ****
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
 
where *u is treated as fixed for the purpose of projection. A valid first order condition 
that is both necessary and sufficient due to convexity of ),( tuF and U is the following: 
find Uu 0 such that 
UudtuuutuFu
ft
t v







 0)(]),([2
1
0
020**    (60) 
By (59) we know that 0* uu  , so (60) reduces to 
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UudtuutuF
ft
t
 0))(,()1(
0
**   (61) 
which is evidently equivalent to (59). This completes the proof. ■ 
6.3 A Fixed Point Algorithm 
Naturally there is a fixed point algorithm associated with the above fixed point 
formulation and expressed as the following iterative scheme: 
)],([1 tuFuPu kkU
k    (62) 
The positive scalar 1R may be chosen empirically to assist convergence and may 
even be changed as the algorithm progresses. We give the following detailed statement 
of the fixed point algorithm: 
Fixed Point Algorithm 
Step 0. Initialization. Identify an initial feasible solution 0u such that Uu 0 and 
set 0k . 
Step 1. Solve optimal control problem. Solve the following optimal control problem: 
UvtsdtvtuFuvJ
ft
t
kkk
v
  ..0]),([2
1
)(min
0
2   (63) 
Call the solution 1ku . 
Step 2. Stopping test. If 1
1  kk uu ‖where 11 R is a preset tolerance, stop 
and declare 1*  kuu . Otherwise set 1 kk and go to Step 1. 
The convergence of the above algorithm is guaranteed under certain conditions, which 
is shown in Friesz (2010). 
6.4 Solving the Sub-Problems 
It is important to realize that the fixed point algorithm (62) can be carried out in 
continuous time provided we employ a continuous-time representation of the solution 
of each subproblem (63). The subproblems are linearly constrained quadratic programs 
and may be solved in a variety of ways. For our purposes in this paper, we use a discrete 
time approximation of each subproblem that is solved using MINOS. A fifth order 
polynomial in time is then fit to the discrete time solution of each subproblem, and the 
next fixed point iteration is carried out in continuous time. Many other schemes may be 
invoked for solving the subproblem (63).  
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7 Pricing Rules and Dual Time Scales 
Generally price changes take time to implement. Furthermore, in many circumstances, it 
is desirable or even mandatory to announce changes in pricing policy in advance. These 
considerations have the effect of introducing a second time scale, with the consequence 
that pricing involves explicit time shifts. An example is 
            SstDtthtt ssssssss    ;,   (abc) 
where 1 R is a positive, real constant representing the time needed to effect a 
price change. Furthermore, 1Rs is a positive, real constant expressing the strength 
of the pricing response of seller Ss to changes in the excess of observed demand 
relative to realized demand. 
Another pricing rule is 
      Sstt ss  0     (???) 
which expresses, of course, monotonic pricing behavior, where again we assume that 
there is an intrinsic time needed to effect a price change. Still another pricing rule is 
    Ssd
tt
t
Sk
t
t
ks 

 


0
0
1
   (???) 
which stipulates that prices are set at or below the market’s moving average price to 
reflect each seller’s learning process relative to its competitors’ prices, as well as the 
intrinsic time delay for price changes. 
The above are but three instances of pricing rules, and many more such rules may be 
conjectured and imposed. It is, of course, important to know how the theory and 
computational approaches presented previously are impacted by the presence of such 
pricing rules. To that end, let us concentrate on constraints (abc), which are linear in 
 ts  and  ts  for given  ts  when     ssss tth  ;,   is linear. In that 
case, we may be certain that the strategy set of each seller is convex in both shifted and 
unshifted prices, as well as in realized demand. That is, the strategy set ),( sss  , is 
convex in ),,( sss D
 for each Ss , where we have used the convenient shorthand 
    Sstt ss 
      (???) 
In the event that the observed demand function is linear in own price, constraint (abc) is 
a linear equality constraint for the best response problem of seller Ss . As such it does 
not alter the linear-quadratic nature of subproblem (63). In particular, when computing, 
one may use an implicit fixed point perspective, which may be expressed as 
    Sstt ks
k
s 
  1,    (???) 
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where this last expression is understood to mean that in iteration 1k  one uses the 
approximate price function found in iteration k . 
8 Numerical Examples 
In this section, we will present three numerical examples to show our results. The first 
example is used to show the general results of the equilibrium prices and profit. The 
second example will be used to compare the results of our robust pricing and non-
robust pricing policy. The third example will illustrate the sensitivities analysis of 
demand parameters and robust parameters. We consider a linear demand function with 
multiplicative uncertainty 
s
sr
rsrsssssssh  )();,( 

 
 
where srss  ,, are nonnegative constants and )(ts is uncertain factor with 
nominal value )(0 ts and magnitude  . The realization of )(ts is randomly generated 
from the uncertainty set sU , which is defined in (29). 
The time horizon is ]10,1[],[ 0 ftt . We consider two firms. The initial endowment of 
inventory for the two firms is 25001 K and 30002 K , respectively. Assume the 
nominal value of the uncertainty factor tts 1.03)(
0  , }2,1{s , ],[ 0 fttt and the 
magnitude 8.0 .   
8.1 General Results of the Robust Pricing Policy 
8.1.1 Two-firms example with identical demand function 
First we consider two competing sellers with the same linear demand functions. The 
parameters values are chosen as following: 
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The results of the robust problem are shown in Figure 1, 2, 3 and Table 1. Figure 1 shows 
that the prices for both sellers are increasing with time. Seller 1's price is slightly higher 
than seller 2's price. Assume the uncertainty factor )(ts follows uniform distribution in 
the uncertainty set, we run 10,000 simulations of the uncertainty factor, and then we 
can obtain the realized demand and compute the realized profit for each seller for each 
simulation. From Figure 2, we can see that the realized demand curve for each seller is 
quite stable. The value of realized demand for seller 1 and seller 2 at every instant time 
over the entire time horizon is around 250 and 300, respectively. Figure 3 shows the 
inventory change for each seller. The inventories of both sellers decrease to zero in the 
end of the time horizon. Before the end of the time horizon, seller 1' inventory is always 
less than seller 2' inventory. Combining Figure 1 and 3, we find that seller with less 
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inventory (seller 1) sets higher price than seller with more inventory (seller 2), but seller 
2 still obtains higher profit than seller 1, which is shown in Table 1. 
8.1.2 Two-firms example with unequal demand function 
We consider two firms with the following different parameters for the linear demand 
function: 
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Figure 4 shows that the price for each seller is increasing with time. And seller 2's price is 
higher than seller 1. The realized demand and inventory change for each seller in this 
example are the same with those in Section 8.1.1. For brief, we omit the corresponding 
figures. The profits for both sellers are shown in Table 2.   
8.2 Effect of Robustness on Price and Profit 
In this section, we consider the effect of robustness on the equilibrium prices and profit. 
We consider two sellers with the following values for the linear demand function: 
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In order to illustrate the effect of robustness, we design the following four scenarios, 
which are shown in Table 3, where `N' means the nominal pricing policy that the seller 
ignores the uncertainty in the demand function and obtains the optimal prices by 
naively assuming ttt ts 1.03)()(
0  . And `R' refers to our robust pricing policy. 
Assume each seller believes that his competitor are using the same pricing policy 
(Bertsimas and Perakis, 2006), we can first obtain the equilibrium prices for each seller 
in Scenario 1 and 4, which are shown in Figure 5 and 6. Prices for each seller in Scenario 
2 and 3 can be easily generated according to Figure 5 and 6. Seller 2' price is higher than 
seller 1 in both Scenario 1 and 4. We find that the prices for both sellers when both 
sellers are using the nominal pricing policy are higher than those when both sellers are 
using the robust pricing policy. 
Here we assume )(ts follows beta distribution and show the results of two different 
beta distributions, beta (1, 3) and beta (1, 1) (uniform distribution). We run 10,000 
simulations for each distribution. Table 4 shows the range, the average value and the 
standard deviation of the realized profit for both sellers for the four scenarios with beta 
(1, 1) distribution. We can see that in Scenario 1 (Both sellers are using the nominal 
pricing policy), the range of profit is [42,271, 49,533] for seller 1 and [66,247, 79,003] for 
seller 2. The average profit for seller 1 is 46,730 with a standard deviation 1,145, and for 
seller 2 is 74,528 with a standard deviation 1,794. In Scenario 2 (Seller 2 changes to use 
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the robust pricing policy), the profit for seller 1 is dramatically less than that in Scenario1, 
with average profit 22,510 and standard deviation 932. It implies that when his 
competitor adopts the robust pricing policy, a seller with nominal pricing policy 
performs much worse than that when he and his competitor both adopt the nominal 
pricing policy. In Scenario 2, although the average profit of seller 2 is lower than that in 
Scenario 1, seller 2 can always make a profit at 73, 885 no matter what the uncertainty 
is. Comparing the results of Scenario 3 to Scenario 1, we can draw the same conclusion. 
In Scenario 4, both sellers are using the robust pricing policy; seller 1 and 2 can obtain 
profit 45,928 and 73,885, respectively, both with standard deviation 0. Our robust 
pricing policy can guarantee sellers to achieve a profit with standard deviation 0, and 
improve much better the worst-case performance compared to the nominal pricing 
policy. 
Table 5 shows the results with beta (1, 3) distribution. Comparing Table 5 and 4, we can 
obtain some new interesting conclusions: (1) The nominal pricing policy with beta (1, 3) 
performs worse than that with beta (1, 1), which implies that the performance of the 
nominal pricing policy depends on the distribution of the uncertainty factor; (2) No 
matter for beta (1, 1) or beta (1, 3), the robust pricing policy yields the same profit, 
which means the performance of the robust pricing policy does not depend on the 
distribution of the uncertainty factor. This makes our robust pricing policy more 
attractive since sellers typically do not know the exact distribution of the uncertainty; (3) 
The robust pricing policy achieves higher average profit than nominal pricing policy with 
beta (1, 3) distribution, no matter which pricing policies his competitor is using. For 
example, in Scenario 3, seller 2's average profit is 42,075, however, in Scenario 4, it 
increases to 73,855. 
In order to show the results more detailed and accurate, we chose seller 1 arbitrarily 
and draw his profit histogram in Scenario 1, 2 and 3 with beta (1, 3) distribution, which is 
shown in Figure 7. 
8.3 Sensitivities Analysis 
8.3.1 Sensitivities analysis of demand parameters 
In this section, we study the sensitivities analysis of demand parameters on price and 
profit. Assume the benchmark of the demand parameters take the following value: 
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First, we vary 1 and see its effect on the price and profit of both sellers. Figure 8 and 9 
show that both sellers' prices are increasing with 1 , but seller 2's price increases less 
than seller 1. Figure 10 shows that the profits of both sellers are increasing with 1 , but 
seller 2 increases less than seller 1, which means that seller 2 is much less sensitive to 
the changes of 1 than seller 1.  
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Second, we vary 1 and see its effect on the price and profit of both sellers. Figure 11 
and 12 shows that prices for seller 1 and 2 are decreasing with 1 , but seller 2 decreases 
less than seller 1. Figure 13 shows that the profits of seller 1 and 2 are also decreasing 
with 1 , but seller 2 decreases less than seller 1, which can be also explained that seller 
2 is much less sensitive to the changes of 1 than seller 1. 
Finally, we vary 2 and see its effect on the price and profit of both sellers, which are 
shown in Figure 14-16. We can obtain the similar results as the analysis of 1 .  
8.3.2 Sensitivities analysis of robust parameter 
In this section, we assume demand parameters for both sellers take the same value as in 
Section 8.2. We focus on the sensitivities analysis of robust parameter on profit. We will 
measure the profit when the actual uncertainty factor )(ts can take any value from the 
uncertainty set while the seller employs a policy that assumes the uncertainty factor 
only takes value from a smaller set. We can do that by varying the magnitude from 0 
(nominal pricing policy) to 0.8 (very robust pricing policy), while the true 
magnitude 8.0 . We obtain the corresponding prices according to , and calculate 
the realized profit. Assume )(ts follows beta (1, 3) distribution. We consider the 
following three cases and run 10,000 simulations for each case: 
 I Seller 2 varies his magnitude while seller 1 adopts the nominal pricing policy 
 II Seller 2 varies his magnitude while seller 1 adopts the very robust pricing policy 
 III Seller 2 and seller 1 vary their magnitude simultaneously 
Figure 17, 18 and 19 show the profit histogram for seller 2 in Case I, II and III, 
respectively. The three figures are all ordered by row-wise from left to right, 
corresponding to the magnitude from 0 to 0.8. In Case I and III, we note that the 
standard deviation of the profit is reducing as seller 2 increases the robust parameter. 
The first six graphs of both Figure 17 and 19 show that the average profit is increasing 
with decreasing standard deviation, however, the last three graphs show that the 
average profit is decreasing with decreasing standard deviation, which means that upon 
a certain level of magnitude, if a seller wants to reduce the standard deviation of his 
profit, he needs to sacrifice a slight of his average profit. Thus, the seller has to tradeoff 
between average profit and standard deviation.  
Figure 18 shows that the average profit of seller 2 first increases, and then decreases as 
seller 2 increases his robust parameter. However, before seller 2's 
magnitude approaches to 0.8, the average profit of seller 2 in Case II is markedly lower 
than that in Case I and III, and the standard deviation in Case II reduces slower than that 
in Case I and III. This is due to that in Case II, seller 2's competitor adopts the very robust 
pricing policy, which makes seller 2 worse off than other cases until seller 2 adopts the 
very robust pricing policy as well.   
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8 Conclusions 
We model a dynamic pricing problem in an oligopolistic market with demand 
uncertainty from a continuous-time perspective. Each seller with a fixed inventory 
competes with each other by setting prices. We use a multiplicative demand function to 
model the uncertain demand, and apply the ideas of robust optimization to deal with 
uncertainty. The uncertain demand constraint is replaced by a robust counterpart; 
hence the robust best response problem becomes a deterministic optimization problem. 
We have shown that the sellers' robust best response problem is a generalized Nash 
equilibrium problem (GNEP), and a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) is employed to 
formulate the GNEP. We prove that the QVI is equivalent to the GNEP, and a generalized 
robust Nash equilibrium exists among sellers. However, since there is no efficient 
convergent algorithm to solve QVI, we build a variational inequality (VI) and prove that 
any solution of the VI is a solution of the QVI, then use a fixed point algorithm to solve 
the VI. In the end, three numerical examples are presented to show the general results 
of our robust pricing policy, the effect of robustness on prices and profit and the 
sensitivities analysis of demand and robust parameters. 
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         Figure 1: Price for each seller           Figure 2: Realized demand for each seller 
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    Figure 3: Inventory change for each seller            Figure 4: Price for each seller 
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   Figure 5: Price for each seller in Scenario 1    Figure 6: Price for each seller in Scenario 4 
Figure 7: Profit histogram for seller 1 in Scenario 1-3 with beta (1, 3) 
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Figure 8: Prices for seller 1 with different 
value of 1  
Figure 9: Prices for seller 2 with different 
value of 1  
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Figure 10: The effect of 1 on profits for each seller 
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Figure 11: Prices for seller 1 with different 
value of 1  
Figure 12: Prices for seller 2 with different 
value of 1  
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Figure 13: The effect of 1 on profits for each seller 
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Figure 14: Prices for seller 1 with different 
value of 2  
Figure 15: Prices for seller 2 with different 
value of 2  
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Figure 16: The effect of 2 on profits for each seller 
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Figure 17: The profit histogram for seller 2 in Case I 
 
Figure 18: The profit histogram for seller 2 in Case II 
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Figure 19: The profit histogram for seller 2 in Case III 
Table 1 Profit for each seller 
 Seller 1 Seller 2 
 Profit 51,542 61,021 
Table 2 Profit for each seller 
 Seller 1 Seller 2 
Profit 43,238 63,542 
Table 3 Pricing policies for both sellers under different scenarios 
 Pricing policies 
Scenario Seller 1 Seller 2 
1 N N 
2 N R 
3 R N 
4 R R 
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Table 4 Range of profit for each seller with beta (1, 1) distribution 
 Profit of seller 1   Profit of seller 2 
Scenario Min. Max. Av. SD Min. Max. Av. SD 
1 42,271 49,533 46,730 1,145 66,247 79,003 74,528 1,794 
2 18,962 25,882 22,510 932 73,885 73,885 73,885 0 
3 45,928 45,928 45,928 0 40527 54,297 47,368 1,913 
4 45,928 45,928 45,928 0 73,885 73,885 73,885 0 
 
Table 5 Range of profit for each seller with beta (1, 3) distribution 
 Profit of seller 1   Profit of seller 2 
Scenario Min. Max. Av. SD Min. Max. Av. SD 
1 39,806 47,425 43,607 1,135 63,899 76,529 69,517 1,822 
2 18,181 22,866 20,030 619 73,885 73,885 73,855 0 
3 45,928 45,928 45,928 0 38,112 47,452 42,075 1,298 
4 45,928 45,928 45,928 0 73,885 73,885 73,855 0 
 
 
